Chants on the Ground

Chants on the Ground

“Death to the Oppressor, Be It the Shah or the Supreme Leader.”

“Death to the Oppressor, Be It the Shah or the Supreme Leader.”

The 2022 uprising in Iran, fueled by decades of oppression, poverty, and injustice, was not only a revolt against theocratic rule—it was a profound declaration by the Iranian people against all forms of dictatorship, including the return of monarchy.

From the earliest days of the protests, the slogans chanted in streets across the country reflected a mature and politically aware society—one that had learned from history and was determined not to repeat it. Among the most powerful and repeated chants was:

“Death to the Oppressor, Be It the Shah or the Supreme Leader.”

This slogan, echoed from Tehran to Tabriz, from Sanandaj to Shiraz, represented the unambiguous rejection of both the current religious tyranny and the previous monarchical dictatorship. It wasn’t a call for reform. It wasn’t a call for power transition within the system. It was a call for fundamental and total regime change—for the creation of a democratic, secular, and pluralistic republic.

The 2022 uprising in Iran, fueled by decades of oppression, poverty, and injustice, was not only a revolt against theocratic rule—it was a profound declaration by the Iranian people against all forms of dictatorship, including the return of monarchy.

From the earliest days of the protests, the slogans chanted in streets across the country reflected a mature and politically aware society—one that had learned from history and was determined not to repeat it. Among the most powerful and repeated chants was:

“Death to the Oppressor, Be It the Shah or the Supreme Leader.”

This slogan, echoed from Tehran to Tabriz, from Sanandaj to Shiraz, represented the unambiguous rejection of both the current religious tyranny and the previous monarchical dictatorship. It wasn’t a call for reform. It wasn’t a call for power transition within the system. It was a call for fundamental and total regime change—for the creation of a democratic, secular, and pluralistic republic.

Despite extensive efforts—by elements inside the regime and certain foreign-funded media outlets—to create confusion or manipulate public perception, the people’s voice was clear. Some platforms, particularly those with financial or ideological ties to external states, tried to reframe the narrative, suggesting that there may be support for a return to monarchy. Certain exiled figures, especially Reza Pahlavi, were promoted as symbolic alternative, as part of an unspoken alliance between status quo powers that feared a true democratic transformation.

But these efforts backfired spectacularly. Rather than deceive the public, they only sharpened the movement’s message. Iranians responded with louder, more defiant chants:

“No Monarchy, No Supreme Leader—Democracy and Equality!”

“Poverty, Corruption, High Prices—We Continue Until Overthrow!”

What became evident is that Iranian society has developed a sophisticated political memory. It remembers that under the Shah, torture chambers operated with impunity. It remembers that political prisoners were executed ruthlessly. It remembers that the Pahlavi dynasty's repression laid the groundwork for the rise of the clerical regime. Moreover, it knows that authoritarianism, no matter its costume—crown or turban—is incompatible with the future Iranians are fighting for.

The people of Iran have not only rejected the Islamic Republic; they have rejected the very concept of rule by dynasty, by decree, or by supreme authority.

Even among young people, many of whom were born long after the Shah’s fall, there was no confusion. They did not see the monarchy as a lost golden age—they saw it as a prequel to their current oppression, and they rejected both with equal force.

Those who still promote monarchist restoration are not only out of step with the people of Iran. They are, knowingly or not, playing into the hands of the regime by weakening the legitimacy and cohesion of the true opposition.

Despite extensive efforts—by elements inside the regime and certain foreign-funded media outlets—to create confusion or manipulate public perception, the people’s voice was clear. Some platforms, particularly those with financial or ideological ties to external states, tried to reframe the narrative, suggesting that there may be support for a return to monarchy. Certain exiled figures, especially Reza Pahlavi, were promoted as symbolic alternative, as part of an unspoken alliance between status quo powers that feared a true democratic transformation.

But these efforts backfired spectacularly. Rather than deceive the public, they only sharpened the movement’s message. Iranians responded with louder, more defiant chants:

“No Monarchy, No Supreme Leader—Democracy and Equality!”

“Poverty, Corruption, High Prices—We Continue Until Overthrow!”

What became evident is that Iranian society has developed a sophisticated political memory. It remembers that under the Shah, torture chambers operated with impunity. It remembers that political prisoners were executed ruthlessly. It remembers that the Pahlavi dynasty's repression laid the groundwork for the rise of the clerical regime. Moreover, it knows that authoritarianism, no matter its costume—crown or turban—is incompatible with the future Iranians are fighting for.

The people of Iran have not only rejected the Islamic Republic; they have rejected the very concept of rule by dynasty, by decree, or by supreme authority.

Even among young people, many of whom were born long after the Shah’s fall, there was no confusion. They did not see the monarchy as a lost golden age—they saw it as a prequel to their current oppression, and they rejected both with equal force.

Those who still promote monarchist restoration are not only out of step with the people of Iran. They are, knowingly or not, playing into the hands of the regime by weakening the legitimacy and cohesion of the true opposition.

Despite extensive efforts—by elements inside the regime and certain foreign-funded media outlets—to create confusion or manipulate public perception, the people’s voice was clear. Some platforms, particularly those with financial or ideological ties to external states, tried to reframe the narrative, suggesting that there may be support for a return to monarchy. Certain exiled figures, especially Reza Pahlavi, were promoted as symbolic alternative, as part of an unspoken alliance between status quo powers that feared a true democratic transformation.

But these efforts backfired spectacularly. Rather than deceive the public, they only sharpened the movement’s message. Iranians responded with louder, more defiant chants:

“No Monarchy, No Supreme Leader—Democracy and Equality!”

“Poverty, Corruption, High Prices—We Continue Until Overthrow!”

What became evident is that Iranian society has developed a sophisticated political memory. It remembers that under the Shah, torture chambers operated with impunity. It remembers that political prisoners were executed ruthlessly. It remembers that the Pahlavi dynasty's repression laid the groundwork for the rise of the clerical regime. Moreover, it knows that authoritarianism, no matter its costume—crown or turban—is incompatible with the future Iranians are fighting for.

The people of Iran have not only rejected the Islamic Republic; they have rejected the very concept of rule by dynasty, by decree, or by supreme authority.

Even among young people, many of whom were born long after the Shah’s fall, there was no confusion. They did not see the monarchy as a lost golden age—they saw it as a prequel to their current oppression, and they rejected both with equal force.

Those who still promote monarchist restoration are not only out of step with the people of Iran. They are, knowingly or not, playing into the hands of the regime by weakening the legitimacy and cohesion of the true opposition.

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Stay informed. Uncover the truth—one story at a time.

Stay informed. Uncover the truth—one story at a time.